A new book about Finland’s and Sweden’s Security Policy
Visiting professor at Vytautas Magnus University A. Rusi published a new book “Together or Separately – Finland’s and Sweden’s Security Policy at the Crossroads” (Yhdessä vai Erikseen- Suomen ja Ruotsin turvallisuuspolitiikka käännekohdassa)
The book “Together or Separately” deals with the security policies of two non-aligned Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden, between 2000 and 2016 and frames it with more theoretical explanations of interstate relations which have traditionally been categorized according to their ”level of analysis”. The book compares the foreign policies of these two countries during the Cold War and after but focuses on the last two decades. The three level-analysis as a theory constitutes the approach and structure of the book.
Both countries faced rapid changes in their security environment as a result of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in the Winter 2014 and growing tensions between Russia and the West. Finland and Sweden are on the side of the West but without the security guarantees of NATO. Their security has been weakening despite non-alignment the aim of which was the strengthening of stability in the region. The author of the book draws the conclusion that non-alignment has not contributed to stability in the Baltic Sea region as was long expected. In both countries the debate on NATO membership has evolved with historic dimensions and new agreements have ben signed both with the United States and Nato members on security co-operation to fill this gap of security.
The level of analysis tells the researcher where to look for the causes of state behavior by classifying competing explanations according to the units in which they are conceptualized. The most used schema, introduced in the 1950s by an American scholar Kenneth Walz, distinguishes three levels of analysis : international-level(or systemic) explanations look to a state’s position in the international system; domestic-level explanations look to the society, culture, and political institutions of individual nation-states; and individual-level explanations look to the personal or psychological characteristics of individual leaders.
The book discusses chronologically the themes in three main chapters and based on three levels of analysis: Chapter I (Emerging Co-operation 2000-2007),Chapter II ( Increasing of Instability 2008-2014), Chapter III( Sharpening of Conflict 2014-2016). The titles of the chapters describe the systemic changes having an impact on the security developments in the Baltic Sea Region and two nonaligned states in particular. The sub-titles in each chapter cover all three levels of analysis.
In the year 2000 Europe was experiencing promising times. The European union as well as NATO were about to enlarge in order to overcome the last dividing lines after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet empire. Finland and Sweden were closer to each other politically and militarily since the separation of 1809, as Prime Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt stated in his famous speech in 1992. Both countries expected Europe to be further unified towards a ”closer union” and Russia somewhat integrated with it. No threat of military conflict was anticipated until the last minutes before the Maidan explosion in the winter 2014.
The domestic sources and a specific strategic culture of Finland and Sweden play a role when explaining their commitment to the doctrine of ”non-alignment” despite the aggressive foreign policy launched by Russia first in words from 2005 and later in deeds from 2008. The strategic culture is based on history and geopolitics as well as the domestic system. Finland was part of Sweden from 1157 to 1809 and was annexed by Russia by military means based on the Tilsit Treaty between Russia and France in 1807. The book discusses the influence of history in this respect.
During the Cold War Sweden had a secret understanding with NATO and the United States that in case of the East-West military conflict, Sweden would not be neutral but allied with NATO (den dolda allianssen). Finland for her part had a Co-operation Treaty (YYA-sopimus) with the Soviet Union signed in Moscow in 1948 which limited the room of maneuvering of Finland and placed it to the military sphere of interest of the Soviet Union.
The two ”neutral” countries were geopolitically separated although economically and politically quite similar. In 1972 President Urho Kekkonen may have been active to secretly start consultations between the High Finnish military officials and the Soviet military attaché in Helsinki during next two years on the implications of the military articles of the 1948 Treaty. The book elaborates this critically based on newly received information from sources close to the Swedish military intelligence.
The book also discusses critically the official arguments in both countries for the maintenance of the status of non-alignment although the aggressiveness of Russia became evident since the war in Georgia in 2008. The author describes the leaders as sleepwalkers and is the opinion that both countries lost the window of opportunity in 2004 when the Baltic states joined NATO. The political prize for joining is much higher in 2016 although more needed than ever before.
One of the arguments for non-alignment has been a need for a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Russia. However, this diplomatic strategy has barely worked and has been more like a failure as the Minsk Process on Ukraine has vindicated. The EU is not a strategic player but an advisory board of security to NATO. Economic sanctions are the only functioning tools available but a source of controversy in the EU and US.
The book discusses widely the future of security arrangements of Finland and Sweden and the Baltic Sea security in general. The region is now a strategic whole and in case one country is attacked by Russia no country can stay neutral. Is the region becoming a target of the Russian hybrid warfare to enlarge the geopolitical sphere of interest of Russia also by using energy co-operation and political means and traditional espionage ,propaganda and as well as sophisticated cyber-attacks? The answer is yes but the issue is, what next?
Sweden disarmed its army in terms its technical resources but also dismantled obligatory military service in 2010. based on a wrong analysis about security developments. Finland although its geopolitical location is more challenging, did not change its military structure and conscript system but rejected NATO membership. The problem is that both countries are between an aggressive Russia and NATO. For NATO Sweden is strategically crucial and the Swedish army is obliged to link it to the NATO structures to fill the gap emerged after the de facto disarmament of its military defense system. However, the non-socialist political parties have agreed to join NATO in case they win the elections in 2018.
The Russian long-term strategy is elaborated which aims at creating conflicts and challenging the liberal and European international order. Russia wants to have its seat in the big power game-table but is economically at the verge of collapse. One can compare Russia of Today with the Soviet Union after the intervention to Afghanistan in the early 1980. Is Vladimir Putin an incarnation of Alexander III of Russia?
The author elaborates policy strategies for Finland and Sweden but also for the Baltic and Nordic states within the EU and NATO but also between themselves and makes an effort to introduce co-operative solutions to avoid military conflicts with Russia. The future remains uncertain and instabilities are in the rise not only in the Baltic Sea Region but in the whole Europe. Finland and Sweden have to decide on v membership either together or separately. The issue is not anymore so much about their own security but about Europe as a whole. The conflict between Russia and the West does not disappear overnight although with respect to the history of Russia, ”anything can change abruptly”, as an expert of Russian affairs Keit Gessen has stressed.
Public lectures by a visiting professor
21-23 November, public lectures by prof. Alpo Rusi, visiting professor at Vytautas Magnus University, will be held.
Prof. A. Rusi served in the Foreign Ministry of Finland in several assignments (Hamburg, Copenhagen, New York, Bonn), and from 1994 to 1999 as foreign policy adviser to the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari. He also served as EU Coordinator for the Sarajevo Summit 1999 and deputy Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Western Balkans in 1999-2000. He worked as professor of International Relations, 2000-2003, at Lapland University and in Hamburg. Later on 2007-2009 he was senior adviser in the Cabinet staff of the President of the UN General Assembly.
A. Rusi was from 2009-2014 the ambassador of Finland to Switzerland, with accreditation also to Liechtenstein and the Holy See. A. Rusi is a recognized scholar in the field of international relations and history of Finland, and has published several books in Finland, and in the United States and Great Britain.
Date | Place | Topic |
November 21, 13:15 | V. Putvinskio g. 23-103 | The Kosovo Peace Process 1999-Can we learn something |
November 22, 13:15 | V. Putvinskio g. 23-311 | Diplomacy in Globalization from the UN perspective |
November 23, 15:00 | Gedimino g. 44-302 | Baltic Security after the US elections |
Public lectures by Alpo Rusi
19-23 September, public lectures by prof. Alpo Rusi, visiting professor at Vytautas Magnus University, will be held.
Prof. A. Rusi served in the Foreign Ministry of Finland in several assignments (Hamburg, Copenhagen, New York, Bonn), and from 1994 to 1999 as foreign policy adviser to the President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari. He also served as EU Coordinator for the Sarajevo Summit 1999 and deputy Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Western Balkans in 1999-2000. He worked as professor of International Relations, 2000-2003, at Lapland University and in Hamburg. Later on 2007-2009 he was senior adviser in the Cabinet staff of the President of the UN General Assembly.
A. Rusi was from 2009-2014 the ambassador of Finland to Switzerland, with accreditation also to Liechtenstein and the Holy See. A. Rusi is a recognized scholar in the field of international relations and history of Finland, and has published several books in Finland, and in the United States and Great Britain.
Date | Place | Title of the lecture |
19 September 16:30 | Gimnazijos g. 7 – 206 | The UN System within the global change |
20 Septermber 13:15 | Gedimino g. 44 – 202 | The conflict between the West and Russia – repercussions in the Baltic Sea Region and in the global international order |
21 September 11:15 | Gedimino g. 44 –202 | EU and Turkey. What‘s next? |
22 September 11:15 | Gimnazijos g. 7 – 411 | After Brexit. The future of the EU |
A. Rusi. European Energy Security
Prof. Alpo Rusi, a visiting professor at Vytautas Magnus UniversityE
European Energy Security – Is the EU too weak to compete with the Energy Companies and to contain Russian geopolitical pressure based on energy interdependence? Nord Stream 2 is a case in point.
My intention is to introduce a couple of viewpoints on European energy security mainly in light of Russia’s new confrontational approach towards Ukraine and the West. As stated in the introduction of the theme of this panel ”it is not surprising that the debate about energy security in the European Union is pushed forward” in order ”to find reliable sources of alternative supplies for limiting of energy blackmail”. My question is also whether the EU is too weak to compete with the Energy companies and too weak to contain Russian geopolitical pressure based on energy interdependence? Additionally, Nord Stream 2 is a case in point.
Europe is not anymore divided as during the Cold War but there already exists an identifiable political and military dividing line between Europe and the Eurasian states controlled by the Russian federation. The economic structures of the post-Soviet economy made it difficult, even impossible to integrate Russia into the European institutions. The question was not about the lack of political will but about history and geopolitics. Schock therapies or other quick methods failed to reform post-Soviet Russian economy. Nationalism replaced communist ideologue as a unifying force and a vertical power system regionalization.
Furthermore, Russia has an interest to push its sphere of influence westwards.”To end up the breaking of Russia”. Contrary to other BRIC countries, Russia displays a propensity to use force to achieve its strategic objectives. The neighboring states of Russia are targets of an advanced hybrid war including direct military threats. Instabilities have reached The Baltic Sea Region but much less in case the Nato enlargement would not have covered the Baltic states.
One of the key tactics to promote Russian geopolitical interest is energy interdependence. Since the vertical Putin system was established during his first term as President, natural gas, even more than oil, became perhaps the most powerful tool of foreign policy. Oil trades freely, gas requires fixed pipelines. The network of pipelines, dating to the Soviet era, gave Russia clout and, with rising energy prices, Putin understood early 2000, that it constitutes the core of Russia’s power. Ukraine, through which most of gas passed, had to be firmly nestled in Russia’s geopolitical embrace.
In the early summer 2005 Gazprom took over with a direct involvement of Putin a major private oil company Sibneft with the cash of 13 billion dollars from the funds of the state’s coffers. Putin controlled the company by picking loyal friends to run it at all levels. Gazprom became one of the largest corporations in the world and a powerful arm of Russian foreign policy from Asia to Europe. By strengthening Gazprom, Putin aimed at strengthening Russia’s geopolitical reach to regain after the collapse of the Soviet sphere of influence.
The construction of the longest underwater natural gas pipeline, Nord Stream 1, was launched already 1997 when Gazprom and the Finnish Neste (later on Fortum) formed a joint company North Transgas, later Nord Stream for the construction of a gas pipeline from Russia to Northern Germany across the Baltic Sea. The project was strongly facilitated by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who had approved one billion loan to Gazprom two weeks before the elections in September 2005, but it took until November 2009, before the Swedish and Finnish authorities gave a permit to lay the pipeline from Viborg to Greifsfald of 1,222 kilometers in their exclusive economic zones. A consortium made up of Russian Gazprom and energy companies E.ON, BASF/Wintershall, OMV, ENGIE and Royal Dutch Shell was created for the Nord Stream 2 project, slated to expand the existing Nord Stream pipeline with current capacity of 55 billion cubic meters.
Nord Stream 1 that was operational in the autumn 2011, and the parallel pipeline the following year had two immediate goals: (1) to bypass the old Soviet pipeline network through Ukraine, Belarus and Poland, and (2) to increase Europe’s dependency on Russia. The project was called by Polish defense minister ”the energy version of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”. For many others is was only a major business deal. In Finland it was even considered that it will strengthen stability in the Baltic Sea because both Germany and Russia were committed to stability for the sake of the pipeline. In 2016 a high share of gas supplies going from Russia to Europe has to pass through Ukraine. Nord Stream 2 is scheduled to be constructed by the end of 2019 which is the same year as the contract between Russia and Ukraine expires.
The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was seen by many as an intense geopolitical contest over the flow of Caspian Sea energy to markets in Europe. The former Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponenannounced a few days after the war in Georgia that he had signed a contract to become a consultant for Nord Stream in order to ”build bridges between the EU and Russia” and because the issue was comic ties, not politics although the Baltic states expressed strong worries about its security policy repercussions.
First a few words about the ongoing energy revolution and about the geopolitical transition in the international system. With reference to the analysis of Professor Peter Lund of Aalto University, we experience an energy revolution at the moment. Old energy sources, like gas and oil, are loosing ground to new energy sources like solar energy and windpower. Russia’s oil and gas reserves are depleted by 2080. The driving force for this revolution is the threat of climate change, but also technology and opportunities it is offering for new jobs.
Lund estimates that by 2050 more than 50% of the energy sources needed are coming from solar energy and windpower. It is needed, however, approximately 50 trillion for investments to achieve these goals. Lund is paying tribute to the US, China,Switzerland, Denmark and Germany for their ambitious strategies to replace the old energy sources with the renewable and clean energy sources. In case professor Lund has predicted the future by and far correctly, the energy revolution may take place parallel with a major geopolitical transition too.
The European security system is fragile but the international order as well The conflict between Russia and the West, but also increasingly there exists a conflict between China and the West with geopolitical dimensions. It has been emphasized that the interconnected infrastructure of the global economy provides the battleground for so called connectivity wars and economic interdependence has been ”weaponized” accordingly, the supply cuts of gas by Russia and the increase of tensions in the South China Sea as examples of ”the connectivity wars”.
Could the EU limit the energy dependency on Russia , that is the most important external supplier of energy to the EU (30% of gas and oil import to the EU) and to develop a united energy community and energy foreign policy for the EU members states? For example Finland gets about 50% of its energy from Russian sources and out of which almost 100% of gas and 85% of raw oil and 12 % of electricity. No gas will come to Lithuania from Russia anymore and Lettland and Estonia follow the suit. This is a major achievement because in 2000 Lithuania was 100% dependent on Russian oil and gas and Lithuania had to use more Russian energy sources again due to the closing of Ignalia nuclear reactor between 2004 to 2009. The getting of rid of the Soviet era electricity transit network BRELL, will take at least one decade to be completed, but bio mass and LNG (liquefied natural gas)-terminal in Klaipeida are examples of the transition taking place in energy sector in Lithuania but also in Lettland an Estonia.
One of the most ambitious projects of the EU Commission is the Energy Union proposed by Donald Tusk when he was Prime Minister of Poland in 2015. The reason for this initiative was, not necessarily climate change but Russia’s cuts of gas supplies to Europe, once in 2006 and again in 2009. The annexation of Crimea by Russia made the establishment of the Energy Union for energy security a much more important goal.
Russia’s room for gas games is constrained by its own capacities, the gas strategies of other players, and the EU’s ability to project its regulatory power. One of the first victims of the annexation of Crimea was South Stream pipeline. Understanding the difficulties, Putin killed the project in December 2014. The sanctions hit hard the inner circle of Putin, like Gennady Timchenko, the owner of Gunvor, an oil trading company registered in Switzerland. He managed to sell all his shares just before the sanctions were introduced.
Vladimir Putin certainly believed that the price of oil would not fall so drastically as it did from the level of 147 (11.7.2008) dollars per barrel and it was believed that the days of affordable oil were over. In December 2008 the price of oil dropped to 32,40 dollars level per barrel being somewhere between 35 to 50 dollars per barrel in 2016. No surprise that Putin accused Washington for the finance crisis of 2008, but for sure he did not predict the collapse of the price when went to war in Georgia. In the US Dept of Energy predictions the price of oil has been estimated in three scenarios: (1) 200 dollars, (2) 130 dollars and (3) 50 dollars.The last one may be closer to the truth which is a catastrophic scenario for Russia.
Since the annexation of Crimea and the sanctions set up against the Russian companies, banks and individuals by the EU and the US, Russia has both intensified its aggressive foreign policy but also improved its economic relations with China and all countries that can avoid punishments by the EU and the US. Presidents Putin and XI have criticized US unilateralism, stepped up their military cooperation and signed major energy deals, like 400 billion dollars Power of Siberia Gas pipeline project. Mongolia managed to get rid of their huge debts by signing an energy contract with Russia. Russian ”oil diplomacy” still plays a role in Asia.
A case in point is the planned gas pipeline Nord Stream 2. The question is whether the plan would contradict the plans of the European Commission. The decision should be taken in the early autumn of 2016 and the construction completed by 2019.
- What kind of an impact will Nord Stream 2 have on the European energy security?
- What are the commercial, legal, and political-policy issues that could potentially prevent the pipeline from being built?
- Is Nord Stream 2 pipeline a geopolitical project that seeks to diminish Ukraine’s gas supply and its role as a transit country for Russia or is Nord Stream 2 a business plan that will help Europe meet its energy demands amidst European Union’s climate change goals?
The Nord Stream 2 has become a very divisive issue inside the EU and the transatlantic community. Within the EU solutions are being sought to prevent Nord Stream 2 from dividing the union into losers and winners. In the Baltic states it is considered as a geopolitical tool and as a bad business deal. In April the Swedish-Estonian community published a resolution in protest of Nord Stream 2 for security reasons. At least the EU has been able to say to Russia that ”comply with our laws and sell as much as you can in our market”. However, this has not solved the political problems. The US administration is skeptical of the argument that the pipeline is a commercial project, pointing out that the existing Nord Stream is not running at full capacity and it could kill LNG-strategy of the Energy Union based mainly on the US reserves.
The timing of Nord Stream 2 is certainly not good. However, energy policies are not based on short term interests. In the early 1980s chancellor Helmut Schmidt pushed a pipeline project forward with the Soviet Union against the objection of Ronald Reagan. Schmidt did not want the Soviet Union to increase its geopolitical influence in Western Europe, but both for the long term consolidation with Moscow as well as for energy security for Western Europe. Today the EU is dealing with the similar kind of problem although the diversification of energy sources are not pushing Europe to the brink of scarcity as it was the case in the 1980s. Prices of electricity may rise, but this does not lead to shortage shocks of energy as it was the case during the oil crises in the 1970s.
In Europe the business community is not unified on Nord Stream 2. One can agree that the commercial and political issues cannot be separated regarding Nord Stream 2. In German business as well as political community in particular they emphasize the need to let the markets fix and support Nord Stream 2. Especially the Social Democrats are advocating the project also for political reasons.
One of the most critical arguments has been expressed by a Swedish scholar Anders Åslund. In his view the EU Commission is too weak to check the big European energy giants and they are now colluding with Gazprom to build a completely unnecessary pipeline to beat Ukraine and get oligopoly with higher prices for European consumers. The EU is not sharing this criticism but insists to keep Ukraine as one of the key transit routes for gas in the future too.
Although oil and gas may loose their attraction in the longer term, Russia is an energy power in the field of nuclear energy and in the search of new territories for energy, like in the Arctic, as part of its geopolitical enlargement strategy. Rosatom has invested to Fennovoima, a Finnish company, to build a new nuclear reactor to Pyhäjoki. The chairman of the Green party Ville Niinistö has criticized the project as a new sign of finlandisation.
Finland will chair the Arctic Council next year and Finland would like to chair the summit for the Council members. Let us hope that this afford would stop militarization of the Arctic.
Conlusions:
1. The short-term question for Europe should not be how to break energy bonds with Russia, but how to limit the damage caused by the Russian aggressive strategy to weaponize energy interdependence. Nord Stream 2 should not be implemented in case no real political unity achieved inside the EU on the project. In particular Finland and Germany should reconsider their business first approach in supporting of Nord Stream 2 in case the Baltic states and Sweden are against.
2. Taking into consideration the ongoing energy revolution and Russia’s problems in the longer term, the EU, for the sake of its energy security, should invest still more effort in finding alternative sources of energy to make itself less dependent on Russian gas. Here again a Baltic-Nordic co-operation is needed for the control of electricity prices as for example Sweden is closing its nuclear reactors and the dependence on Russian gas diminished.
3. The Arctic should be safeguarded from geopolitical competition and for environmental reasons.
4. Energy security needs to be better integrated to an overall security strategy of the EU taking into consideration hard security (geopolitics), energy revolution as well as soft security (i.e. environmental factors). Consequently, I would like to raise the question whether there exists a conflict of interest after the annexation of Crimea by Russia that two former heads of the governments of the EU are involved as well paid experts in Nord Stream 2 project. President Vladimir Putin can be identified as the real initiator of Nord Stream pipelines also for geopolitical interests of Russia.
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION | POLITICAL DIALOGUE & ANALYSIS
Conference of the Working Group of Young Foreign Policy Experts in Stockholm
May 26, 2016, 17:30-19:00
Stockholm, Sweden
First Hotel Norrtull
Sankt Eriksgatan 119